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The Management of Greek Sovereign Risk
Chiara Oldani*
Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis
After the subprime credit crisis of 2007, the world is no longer what we thought. An
unprecedented crisis of confidence was combined with a credit crunch, and the G20 countries
had to enact massive public spending programs to save the economy and at least buffer the
inevitable hard landing. American and European taxpayers paid most of the cost of the crisis,
and moral hazard has not yet been eliminated. Excessive public spending boosted sovereign
debt and financial markets became suspicious with weak countries. Greece reported that in
2009 it had run into an unprecedented deficit of 15.4% of GDP, and that its public debt had
skyrocketed to 126.8% (Table 1). The Greek crisis is the product of years of recession, sluggish
economic environment and poor productivity, but above all it is the product of the
mismanagement of the public finances and unsatisfactory reporting and accounting practices.
Greece entered the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2003, but deliberately carried
out a series of financial operations that were not properly reported. Aim of these operations
was to match the European budget criteria. A comprehensive EU report on this issue (EU,
2010) uses harsh terms to describe the conduct of the Greek authorities—‘deliberate
misreporting’, ‘methodological problems’, ‘unsatisfactory technical procedures in the Greek
statistical institute’, ‘inappropriate governance’, ‘poor cooperation and lack of clear
responsibilities’. The EU notes that “the most recent revisions are an illustration of the lack
of quality of Greek fiscal statistics … and show that the progress in the compilation of fiscal
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In 2010, excessive public spending produced the first sovereign bond market crisis in
Europe: Greece. The Hellenic crisis is the product of years of recession, sluggish
economic environment and poor productivity, and above all, it is the product of the mismanagement
of public finances and unsatisfactory reporting, risk management and accounting practices.
Information about Greece is scarce and fragmented, but the inability of the European authorities
to understand the incredible mismanagement strongly disappoints the taxpayer. The relevant
exposure of European banks in the bond market toward the default risk of Greece supports the need
for hedging tools such as Credit Default Swap (CDS). However, there is evidence that the CDS
market on Greek sovereign bonds is segmented, and the contracts are mis-priced. The lack of
comprehensive data on CDS and other Over-the-Counter (OTC) contracts impedes any further
investigation. European authorities should consider revising CDS’s trading rules and requirements,
until the risks produced are properly limited.
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                              Year 2006 2007 2008 2009
Net Borrowing (–)/ Net Lending (+) as % of GDP –5.7 –6.4 –9.4 –15.4
General Government Consolidated Gross Debt as % of GDP 106.1 105.0 110.3 126.8
Table 1: Greek Government Deficit/Surplus and Debt Levels
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority/Eurostat, UniCredit Research, November 2010
statistics in the country, and the intense scrutiny by Eurostat since 2004, have not sufficed to
bring the quality of Greek fiscal data to the level reached by other EU Member States”. It goes
on to admit that “Eurostat is at present not in a position to validate figures, which are of
acceptable statistical quality.” Since 2000 the Commission has revised the official Greek data
repeatedly, most severely in 2004 and 2009. The defeat is hard to manage in Brussels.
In 2000-02, Greece entered into currency and interest rate swaps with Goldman Sachs to
hedge risks and reduce the cost of sovereign debt. At the time these transactions were
compliant with European accounting rules (which were substantially nonexistent). Goldman
Sachs reports in February 2010 that those transactions produced a debt reduction of €2.367 bn.
However, Goldman Sachs has not signed any other derivative contract with Greece since
2004, in accordance with Eurostat rules. The cost reduction has been produced by the
effective currency hedge (of the drachma with the dollar and the yen), and by the interest
rate hedge. Greece closed out its swap deals after 2002, but misreported the remaining streams
of interest. In the 2005 and 2008 revisions, the effects were incorporated and the data revised
retroactively. According to the EU, this was a case of deliberate misreporting.
Piga (2001) investigated the use of interest and exchange rate swaps by European states
prior to monetary union, concluding that some countries used these instruments not only to
hedge and reduce public debt risks but also as window-dressing—shifting interest payments
forward in order to reduce deficit and debt ratios, and then qualify for membership in the
Monetary Union. Greece is a part of this group, as is Italy. The key point, however, is that the
Greece window-dressing continued even after adoption of the single currency.
In 2004 and 2005, with the application of new Eurostat rules, swaps contracts were closed
out. The resulting costs or gains were counted towards the fiscal outturn in these years.
Terminating the contracts before scheduled maturity meant amortizing the costs over a
shorter period, and the reduction in the cost of the debt was wiped out (as it was not
realized). As a result, the net present value turned negative, aggravating the deficit in 2004
and 2005. But Greece did not record these events properly in the accounts (EU, 2010, p. 22).
The EU revised Greek data, sharply raising debt and deficit ratios.
According to the EU report and the press (Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2010),Greece
continued to enter into swaps after 2005, but not directly, that is, it acted through other
institutions, as the EU report describes in detail. The Greek government financed the deficit
through the National Bank of Greece (a commercial bank), violating the Maastricht rules.
In 2008, the National Bank of Greece accessed European Central Bank (ECB) refinancing,
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posting as collateral notes issued
by Titlos Plc. Titlos Plc is a Special
Purpose Vehicle, created by the
National Bank of Greece itself
together with Goldman Sachs, that
sold €5.1 bn worth of notes
maturing in February 2039 to the
National Bank of Greece. But the
Greek Treasury wholly owns the
National Bank, so this would
appear to be a way of financing the
debt but circumventing controls
and prohibitions. The end result is
that the Treasury’s deficit was
securitized through the National
Bank of Greece, which gets
liquidity from the ECB, thanks to
the Titlos notes. The final cost of
the Greek debt is thus the ECB’s
main refinancing rate. These
operations represent a fraudulent
violation of European accounting
rules, in that they do not reflect
the greater risk of the Greek
sovereign debt (as measured by its
spread with respect to German
Bunds).
The Greek Rescue Plan
of 2010-11
In December 2009 the ECB
published a legal-studies working
paper titled, “Withdrawal and
Expulsion from the EU and EMU.”
Apart from the publication’s
timing, which is hard to see as
merely coincidental, the
conclusion is that the extreme
solution (expulsion) cannot be
precluded; it is just very
complicated, now that the Lisbon
Treaty has been adopted and a very
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large majority would be required. An easier solution would be voluntary withdrawal from the
EU, which would certainly be less expensive for all concerned. A member state’s withdrawal
from the EMU would certainly have an adverse impact on the credibility of the monetary
union itself, but it would also strengthen the constraints for those that remain. The balance
between pros and cons is not merely economic, of course, and the final decision has already
been taken. The Ecofin Council has moved to save Greece.
The Greek crisis exploded in January 2010, and the Hellenic government was forced to
undertake a severe austerity plan. According to official releases, the deficit will be reduced by
spending reduction (sharp cuts in civil servants’ pay and benefits), pension reform (whose
effects will be realized over a decade) and tax increases (VAT from 19% to 21%, and the
elimination of many tax deductions and exemptions). The austerity plan projects the public
debt going down to 100% of GDP by 2020. The European Financial Stability Fund will
stabilize liquidity. The parliamentary elections of October 2010 returned the majority to
Prime Minister, George Papandreou (Pasok party), thereby confirming popular backing for
his draconian austerity plan. The spending cuts are combined with reduced public hiring, at
the expense of the younger generations. The public sector overhaul provokes social and
political conflict, fuels disorder and decreases the likelihood of success.
The most complicated aspects of the plan is slimming Greece’s bloated public sector and
eliminating massive tax evasion (especially of VAT). These two problems cannot be solved
by spending cuts alone. Organizational overhaul is needed. The Hellenic state currently
hires almost 40% of working population, creating distortions in the pricing and equilibrium
of the labor market.
In March 2010, Greece asked for the help of the EU and the IMF. After prolonged
discussion, a 3-year rescue plan worth €110 bn was agreed on.
Who Owns Greek Bonds and Risk?
According to BIS data referring to September 2010, German and French banks held
respectively $40.3 and $59.4 bn of Greek debts (sovereign, corporate and private), and
$108 bn is held by the ECB. The first figure refers to the public and private wealth
(i.e., sovereign bonds, shares, and other private liabilities), while the second is the product of
the Ecofin rescue plan (i.e., sovereign bonds). American and British banks have a smaller
exposure.
The moral hazard in this crisis is relevant; the banking industry is exposed to sovereign
risk, and the rescue plan has positively influenced their risk exposure. The sustainability of
the rescue plan is of central importance to avoid a new banking crisis.
The rating of Greek bonds fell to BB+ in 2010, and most of the Greek debt is now sold off-
market, in order to avoid excessive interest payments. The yield on Greek sovereign bonds
has trended upward throughout the year, and in May 2011 it has been down graded to junk
level.
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In 2011, €22 bn worth of Greek public bonds will expire and €33 bn of bonds will expire
in 2012; Greece cannot re-finance these amounts, and some European countries are against
a new rescue plan without any collateral. According to first consultations as of May 2011,
Greece will be requested to employ privatization to directly re-finance public debt and
European creditors. To avert another Russian-style crisis, the IMF and the EU make regular
visits to Greece to verify the country’s effective ability to implement the plan. The withdrawal
from the Union cannot be still ruled out.
Figure 2: Bank’s Sovereign Risk Exposure (WSJ, May 16, 2011)
Out on a Limb?
Bank’s exposure to the debt of Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain
Amounts Outstanding in Selected Countries
Note: Figures are as of September 30, 2009, and are only for countries whose central banks report to the BIS.
Source: Bank for International Settlements
Germany
$524.1 bn
France
$385.0 bn
UK
$349.3 bn
Netherlands
$385.0 bn
US
$149.3 bn
Belgium
$135.1 bn
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CDS on Greek Bonds: The Missing Link
Financial derivatives can be employed to smooth the costs of debt, and to hedge outstanding
debt. This is coherent with the efficient market hypothesis that justified the weak control
and monitoring on deregulated financial markets and instruments. Credit Default Swaps
(CDSs) are very popular financial contracts suitable for hedging credit risks. They are traded
Over-the-Counter (OTC), and volumes of trading increased recently. The information
disclosed about this market is very poor; nominal volumes are monitored by the BIS (http:/
/www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1011.htm), but nominal values are inflated and do not reflect the
effective liquidity of this market.
The BIS reports in June 2010 that $2.4 bn of CDS on sovereign bonds are traded
(measured at their notional amount) over a total worth of $18.4 bn (see Table 2); nothing is
known about who is holding such contracts (i.e., hedgers or not) and about the potential
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domino effect. The structure of CDS contracts is such that protection sellers are exposed to
sovereign default risk; sellers can be banks, insurance companies, and financial and non-
financial institutions. According to BIS data, dealers trade over 50% of contracts (measured
at notional amount), roughly $16 bn out of total $23 bn, while banks trade in their name just
$4 bn. Non-financial institutions, hedge funds and insurance trade around 5% of the market
each. Maturity is mostly between 1 and 5 years. Dealers usually trade at banks, and then we
can consider that the banking system trades more than 50% of CDS. Data on CDS on
sovereign bonds basing on reporting institution is not provided. The distribution of
counterparties and risks in the CDS market is not known, since there is no central clearing
process. This ‘known unknown’ confirms the need for further investigation.
Notional Amounts Notional
Instrument/Counterparty Outstanding Amounts Total
 Bought Outstanding Sold
Total single-name instruments 14,486,640 14,366,151 18,379,414
  Reporting dealers 10,475,547 10,471,207 10,473,377
  Other financial institutions 3,804,347 3,718,929 7,523,276
       Banks and security firms 2,563,877 2,421,982 4,985,859
       Central counterparties 585.279 570,580 1,155,859
        Insurance and financial guaranty firms 82,096 48,782 130.878
      SPVs, SPCs and SPEs 84,387 91,892 176.279
       Hedge funds 161,830 262,853 424.683
       Other financial customers 326,879 322,839 649.718
Non-financial institutions 206,746 176,015 382.761
Maturity of one year or less 1,836,178 1,820,806 2,333,557
Maturity over one year and up to five years 9,892,247 9,854,231 12,482,355
Maturity over five years 2,758,213 2,691,114 3,563,500
Sovereigns 1,868,957 1,843,525        2,392,475
Non-sovereigns 12,617,689 12,522,627 15,986,947
Investment grade 10,045,975 9,950,618 12,812,872
Below investment grade 3,271,847 3,289,147 4,079,331
Non-rated 1,168,823 1,126,387 1,487,218
Table 2: Credit Default Swaps Market
Single-Name Instruments Notional Amounts Outstanding at End June 2010
Source: Bank for International Settlements, May 2011
 (in $ mn)
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The finance literature has investigated the CDS’ theoretical behavior and contribution
in financial markets. Empirical investigations on CDS’ pricing are rare, due to scarcity of
data. Ericsson et al. (2009) investigated the explanatory power of variables that in theory
should determine credit spreads. Their results confirm that volatility, firm leverage and the
riskless interest rate play a role. Nevertheless, results change dramatically when considering
levels or differences, and considering different econometric methods. This confirms our
suspect of mis-functioning.
The booming public debt has influenced the spread of bonds, but with asymmetric effects
on the primary and the secondary markets. The primary market still enjoys reasonable prices;
demand and supply meet and demand actually overcomes supply for most European countries.
This happens because of excess supply of money created by central banks (European, Japanese
and American). Small returns on sovereign bonds come with small risk, and risk neutral or
risk-averse institutional investors like pension funds, public firms and insurance companies
prefer this market basically for statutory reasons.
The so-called Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) manoeuvre of the US Federal Reserve bought
roughly $600 bn Treasury bonds to sustain the market and the recovery process (Board of
Governors, 2010-11). The ECB is far more opaque in its action and does not disclose its assets
and portfolio strategy, but inundates the market as well. The Japanese Central Bank is printing
money for free since 1998.
On the contrary, aggressive operators with risk-loving attitude populate the secondary
market (hedge funds, investments banks and others). They do not enjoy the direct effects of
central banks’ liquidity. Higher spreads of the secondary markets reflect not only the effective
risk of certain debtors (like Greece), but also the high speed of adjustment of risk-lover
operators, fuelling further volatility. The pricing mechanism is not working properly, and the
fundamental condition of absence of arbitrage cannot be verified.
The issues that need to be clarified with respect to the role of CDS on sovereign bonds are
basically: the difficulty in CDS clearing and management, the liquidity, and the value of the
assets underlying the swap contract.
• The CDS market populated by unregulated operators, is OTC and thus not accessible
by retail customers; contracts are priced in US dollars, transparency is not required.
According to Shadab (2009), CDS are superior to securitization in transferring
risks and the crisis has been the result not of the financial instruments themselves,
but was due to their concentration outside the regulated financial system, under
no compensation system. The US Federal Reserve of New York (2010) aims at
introducing a centralized clearing system (i.e., electronic trading platforms) to
promote efficiency. However, there will remain a population of customized contracts
managed bilaterally. The EU Commission is considering the introduction of a
clearing-house system for OTC derivatives trading (EU, 2009). This would improve
the settlement and pricing, but would reduce the attractiveness of OTC market,
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pushing for new innovations. Shadab (2009) had made the same conclusion for
the American financial system. The alternative solution would be to introduce
some forms of capital requirements. This seems to be more reasonable, although
not very easy to implement. The EU antitrust commission in May 2011 started the
investigation of the degree of concentration of dealers in the CDS market, in order
to avoid any violation of competition rules and maintain financial stability (EU,
2011).
• What is the liquidity of the CDS market? Answering this is not easy, since OTC
derivatives markets are not liquid by definition, but can ‘substitute liquidity’. The
liquidity necessary to open a position in the CDS market is far smaller than in the
secondary or primary bond market, but the underlying risk is the same. The liquidity
is so abundant in the primary bond market that spreads do not reflect effective
Figure 3: Yield of Greek 10Y Bonds 2010-11
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risks (e.g., Greek bonds) (see Figure 3). On the contrary the spreads in the secondary
market reflect both risks and lack of confidence; CDS market behaves like the
secondary market that is completely absent for Greece (i.e., illiquid), markets are
segmented and pricing is inefficient (since spreads on the same bond are different
in the primary and secondary markets). The trading of CDS is coherent with
portfolios exposed to sovereign bonds. CDS are traded to replicate the illiquid
secondary market and create Credit-Linked Notes (CDNs).1 With credit link notes
the investor buys the same risk of bond, without investing the same amount of
money. This happens under no supervision on the distribution of risks created in
the CDS and CLN markets (counterparty information is undisclosed).
• If the pricing mechanism is not efficient, either contracts are mis-priced or the
value of the underlying assets is not univocally defined (i.e., multiple equilibrium).
I do believe in the second explanation because of market segmentation. Considering
that asset swap can be the counterproof; asset swap represents the degree of
confidence of investors in that class of assets. Actually, the Greek situation is such
that it can either default or not, there is no Chapter 11 creditor protection, and in
case of bankruptcy losses are 100% for creditors. Asset swap on Greek sovereign
bonds confirms a high level of confidence that comes from the primary market,
because the value of the underlying asset is priced considering a 0% probability of
default. If Greece defaults the entire Euro area goes into a deep crisis (contagion to
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the primary market does not price this event. The
secondary market on the contrary attaches some probability to the Greek
restructuring debt, since the path of public debt seems to be unsustainable. The
mis-pricing between the underlying and the swap contract violates the pricing
rules of derivatives.
According to these three fundamental issues, CDS represents a small dangerous threat to
financial stability because of opacity, absence of a compensation system, liquidity that is not
distributed uniformly, and mis-pricing of contracts.
1 A CLN is a derivative which offers synthetic exposure on a CDS. CLNs are structured securities whose principal
and interest payments are contingent on the performance of specified borrower companies, or reference entities.
They are created by embedding a CDS in a funded asset to form an investment whose credit risk and cash flow
characteristics resemble those of a bond or loan. The difference between a CDS and CLN is that the credit-
linked note is an on-balance sheet item. CLNs are primarily used for CDSs, but can be used as a hedge for other
forms of debt. A company looking to spread its risk for a specific credit event will look to issue CLNs in order to
transfer this exposure to credit investors. Special Purpose Companies (SPCs) or trusts create the CLNs, which
start out with a AAA credit rating and then act as a broker between the credit issuer (company) and credit
investors. These notes are offered to investors as both a CDS (riskier investment) and the AAA bond at par value.
Credit investors are willing take on this credit risk in hopes of receiving a higher yield on their investments than
with typical bonds. The trust or third party will then sell default protection in return for a premium that
subsidizes the coupon payments to be made to the holder of the CLN. Hence, the credit investor has exposure to
both the CLN and the credit issuer.
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Conclusion
Following the underestimation of the risks and repercussions of mortgage-backed securities
and CDS, the Greek crisis confirms that the world has changed with the spread of derivatives
in global financial markets. Complex derivatives make transactions and balance sheets more
opaque, opening up opportunities for subprime and predatory lending and the mismanagement
of public debt. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) principles (i.e., fair
value) will ensure better measurement of countries’ effective risk exposure, but they will also
make total balance sheet size more dependent on financial market cycles and increase the
volatility of the debt.
The EU official documents make it clear that Greece did not actually violate proper
accounting rules, which were not introduced until after the derivative contracts were made;
but it did violate the principles and limits imposed by the European treaties, omitting
relevant information. The market accordingly punished it by lowering the country’s credit
rating to a level that forced international institutions to intervene as lender of last resort.
The expulsion or withdrawal of Greece from the Union would be politically unsustainable,
which will presumably help the other peripheral EU member states with troubled finances
(Portugal, Ireland and Spain) in 2011-12. The numerous revisions of the Greek public
accounting data and the subsequent crisis confirm that the incentives to cheat far exceeded
the potential cost, and disappointed the European taxpayer to a larger extent. The condition
for the rescue plan to succeed in the medium term is that its costs (austerity plan) should not
exceed revenues (debt bail out). Most economic analyses see the solution in productivity
improvements, which can speed Greek economic growth and thus ease the burden of debt.
Such a structural overhaul can only come from national policy, with reforms that so far are
only minimally under way.
The relevant exposure of European banks to the default risk of Greece supports the need
for hedging tools, such as CDS. The ECB, German and French banks held around
$210 bn of Greek liabilities as of September 2010. However, the CDS market is not efficient
and is segmented. The primary bond market is populated by risk-neutral or risk-averse
operators and is inundated by central banks liquidity (i.e., squeezing spreads); the secondary
market is very volatile and dried (and spreads explode), and the missing link is the CDS market.
The re-packaging of risks in portfolios implemented by banks is very difficult in the presence
of structural weaknesses in the pricing mechanism. The moral hazard of CDS trading by the
banking system is not negligible, since banks own a large amount of the underlying risk, but
according to available data its magnitude cannot be evaluated. This lack of data represents a
further danger to financial stability.
International financial institutions have supported the spread and use of financial
derivatives, including CDS to smooth the cost of debt and/or hedge, but CDS on sovereign
bonds represents a small dangerous threat to financial stability because of the opacity, the
absence of a compensation system, the liquidity that is not distributed uniformly, and the
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mis-pricing of such contract. 
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